Stable profit sharing in a patent licensing game: general bargaining outcomes

Naoki Watanabe and Shigeo Muto ()

International Journal of Game Theory, 2008, vol. 37, issue 4, pages 505-523

Keywords: Licensing; Coalition structure; Bargaining set; Core; C71; D45; D43 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
View list of references View citations in EconPapers

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00182-008-0130-9 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:jogath:v:37:y:2008:i:4:p:505-523

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://link.springer.de/orders.htm

International Journal of Game Theory is edited by W. Thomson

More articles in International Journal of Game Theory from Springer
Series data maintained by Christopher F Baum ().