A note on selection of proposers in coalitional bargaining

Tomohiko Kawamori ()

International Journal of Game Theory, 2008, vol. 37, issue 4, pages 525-532

Keywords: Selection of proposers; Recognition probability; Protocol; Efficiency; Coalitional bargaining; C78; C72; C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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