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On equilibrium in pure strategies in games with many players

Edward John Cartwright () and Myrna Wooders ()

International Journal of Game Theory, 2009, vol. 38, issue 1, pages 137-153

Keywords: Bayesian equilibrium; Purification; Large games; Semi-anonymity; Ex-post stability; Shapley–Folkman Theorem; Countable strategy space; C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Related works:
Working Paper: On Equilibrium in Pure Strategies in Games with Many Players (2003) Downloads
Working Paper: On Equilibrium in Pure Strategies in Games with Many Players (2005) Downloads
Working Paper: On Equilibrium in Pure Stategies in Games with Many Players (2003) Downloads
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