Analysis and design of selection committees: a game theoretic secretary problem

Steve Alpern () and Shmuel Gal ()

International Journal of Game Theory, 2009, vol. 38, issue 3, pages 377-394

Keywords: Committee; Stochastic game; Voting; Veto (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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