# Absence-proofness: Group stability beyond the core

*Emre Doğan* ()

Additional contact information

Emre Doğan: National Research University Higher School of Economics

*International Journal of Game Theory*, 2016, vol. 45, issue 3, pages 601-616

**Abstract:**
Abstract We introduce a new cooperative stability concept, absence-proofness (AP). Given a TU game $$\left( {N,v} \right) $$ N , v , and a solution well defined for all subsocieties, a group of people $$S\subseteq N$$ S ⊆ N may benefit by partially seceding from cooperation. $$T\subseteq S$$ T ⊆ S stays out, and collects its stands alone benefits while $$S\backslash T$$ S \ T receives its allocation specified by the solution at the reduced problem where only $$N\backslash T$$ N \ T is present. We call a solution manipulable if $$S$$ S can improve upon its allocation in the original problem by such a maneuver, and solutions that are immune to such manipulations are called absence-proof. We show that population monotonicity (PM) implies AP, and AP implies separability. In minimum cost spanning tree problems, by replacing PM with AP, we propose a family of solutions that are easy to compute and more responsive than the well-known Folk solution to the asymmetries in the cost data, keeping all its fairness properties.

**Keywords:** Core; Absence-proofness; Population monotonicity (search for similar items in EconPapers)

**Date:** 2016

**References:** View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc

**Citations** Track citations by RSS feed

**Downloads:** (external link)

http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s00182-015-0472-z Abstract (text/html)

Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.

**Related works:**

This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

**Export reference:** BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text

**Persistent link:** http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:jogath:v:45:y:2016:i:3:d:10.1007_s00182-015-0472-z

**Ordering information:** This journal article can be ordered from

http://www.springer. ... eory/journal/182/PS2

Access Statistics for this article

International Journal of Game Theory is currently edited by *Shmuel Zamir*, *Vijay Krishna* and *Bernhard von Stengel*

More articles in International Journal of Game Theory from Springer, Game Theory Society

Series data maintained by Sonal Shukla ().