Review of Economic Design
1994 - 2010
Edited by Atila Abdulkadiroglu and Matthew O. Jackson
from Springer
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Volume 14, issue 1, 2010
- Implementation of solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked pp. 1-15

- William Thomson
- On Maskin monotonicity of solution based social choice rules pp. 17-25

- Claus-Jochen Haake and Walter Trockel
- Equilibrium participation in public goods allocations pp. 27-50

- Paul Healy
- Fundamental impossibility theorems on voluntary participation in the provision of non-excludable public goods pp. 51-73

- Tatsuyoshi Saijo and Takehiko Yamato
- Optimal information transmission in organizations: search and congestion pp. 75-93

- Àlex Arenas, Antonio Cabrales, Leon Danon, Albert Díaz-Guilera, Roger Guimerà and Fernando Vega-Redondo
- On aggregation and welfare analysis pp. 95-129

- James Moore
- Cores of many-player games; nonemptiness and equal treatment pp. 131-162

- Myrna Wooders
- Implementation of marginal cost pricing equilibrium allocations with transfers in economies with increasing returns to scale pp. 163-184

- Guoqiang Tian
- Random iterates of monotone maps pp. 185-192

- Rabi Bhattacharya and Mukul Majumdar
- The global LeChatelier Principle and multimarket equilibria pp. 193-201

- George Lady and James Quirk
- The current non-status of general equilibrium theory pp. 203-219

- Donald Katzner
- Regional business development policy in Central and Eastern Europe: a mechanism design perspective pp. 221-242

- Roswitha King
Volume 13, issue 4, 2009
- Can the majority lose the election? pp. 305-317

- Bryan McCannon
- Efficient trading with restriction pp. 319-334

- Hu Lu and Yuntong Wang
- Optimal auctions and information disclosure pp. 335-344

- Alex Gershkov
- How does interest rate policy affect inflation? A simple general equilibrium model with the interest rate as the policy instrument pp. 345-360

- Richard Watt
- A noncooperative view on two airport cost sharing rules pp. 361-376

- J. Arin, E. Inarra and P. Luquin
- The human side of mechanism design: a tribute to Leo Hurwicz and Jean-Jacques Laffont (Publisher’s Erratum) pp. 377-377

- Daniel L. McFadden
Volume 13, issue 3, 2009
- Institutional design and conflict: an introduction pp. 167-170

- Massimo Morelli
- Power and efficiency in production pillage games pp. 171-193

- J. Jordan
- Alliances and negotiations: an incomplete information example pp. 195-203

- Paola Manzini and Marco Mariotti
- A model of strategic delegation in contests between groups pp. 205-232

- Stefan Brandauer and Florian Englmaier
- Mechanism design goes to war: peaceful outcomes with interdependent and correlated types pp. 233-250

- Mark Fey and Kristopher Ramsay
- Sanctions as revelation regimes pp. 251-278

- Daniel Verdier
- Arbitration systems and negotiations pp. 279-303

- María Mercedes Adamuz and Clara Ponsati
Volume 13, issue 1, 2009
- Introduction to the issues in honor of Leonid Hurwicz pp. 1-1

- John Ledyard
- Two topics in Leo Hurwicz’s research pp. 3-6

- Stanley Reiter
- Inefficiency and complementarity in sharing games pp. 7-43

- Dennis Courtney and Thomas Marschak
- Strategic analysis of petty corruption with an intermediary pp. 45-57

- Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky, Mukul Majumdar and Roy Radner
- Fundamental theory of institutions: a lecture in honor of Leo Hurwicz pp. 59-75

- Roger Myerson
- The human side of mechanism design: a tribute to Leo Hurwicz and Jean-Jacque Laffont pp. 77-100

- Daniel L. McFadden
- Discrete implementation of the Groves–Ledyard mechanism pp. 101-114

- J. Todd Swarthout and Mark Walker
- Communication complexity and stability of equilibria in economies and games pp. 115-135

- J. Jordan
- Non-existence of equilibrium in Vickrey, second-price, and English auctions pp. 137-145

- Matthew O. Jackson
- The endowment game when n=2 pp. 147-165

- Lu Hong
Volume 12, issue 4, 2008
- Informed principal and information gathering agent pp. 229-244

- Dongsoo Shin and Sungho Yun
- Optimal auctions for asymmetrically budget constrained bidders pp. 245-257

- Alexey Malakhov and Rakesh Vohra
- Opportunity analysis of newborn screening programs pp. 259-277

- Carmen Herrero and Juan D. Moreno-Ternero
- Differentiable strategy-proof mechanisms for private and public goods in domains that are not necessarily large or quasi-linear pp. 279-291

- Luis C. Corchon and José Rueda-Llano
- Coordinating under incomplete information pp. 293-313

- Geir B. Asheim and Seung Yoo
Volume 12, issue 3, 2008
- Optimal fees in internet auctions pp. 155-163

- Alexander Matros and Andriy Zapechelnyuk
- Price experimentation with strategic buyers pp. 165-187

- Oksana Loginova and Curtis Taylor
- Innovation contests with temporary and endogenous monopoly rents pp. 189-208

- Frederik Schmidt
- On the optimality of nonmaximal fines in the presence of corruptible law enforcers pp. 209-227

- Gorkem Celik and Serdar Sayan
Volume 12, issue 2, 2008
- Matching, search and intermediation with two-sided heterogeneity pp. 75-117

- Nadia Burani
- Labour market recruiting with intermediaries pp. 119-127

- Paul Schweinzer
- Optimal procurement mechanisms for divisible goods with capacitated suppliers pp. 129-154

- Garud Iyengar and Anuj Kumar
Volume 12, issue 1, 2008
- Good neighbors are hard to find: computational complexity of network formation pp. 1-19

- Richard Baron, Jacques Durieu, Hans Haller, Rahul Savani and Philippe Solal
- Price asymptotics pp. 21-32

- Kislaya Prasad
- A coalitional game-theoretic model of stable government forms with umpires pp. 33-44

- Stefano Vannucci
- Optimal speculative trade among large traders pp. 45-74

- Kfir Eliaz and Ran Spiegler