Review of Economic Design

1994 - 2010

Edited by Atila Abdulkadiroglu and Matthew O. Jackson

from Springer
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Implementation of solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked pp. 1-15: William Thomson
On Maskin monotonicity of solution based social choice rules pp. 17-25: Claus-Jochen Haake and Walter Trockel
Equilibrium participation in public goods allocations pp. 27-50: Paul Healy
Fundamental impossibility theorems on voluntary participation in the provision of non-excludable public goods pp. 51-73: Tatsuyoshi Saijo and Takehiko Yamato
Optimal information transmission in organizations: search and congestion pp. 75-93: Àlex Arenas, Antonio Cabrales, Leon Danon, Albert Díaz-Guilera, Roger Guimerà and Fernando Vega-Redondo
On aggregation and welfare analysis pp. 95-129: James Moore
Cores of many-player games; nonemptiness and equal treatment pp. 131-162: Myrna Wooders
Implementation of marginal cost pricing equilibrium allocations with transfers in economies with increasing returns to scale pp. 163-184: Guoqiang Tian
Random iterates of monotone maps pp. 185-192: Rabi Bhattacharya and Mukul Majumdar
The global LeChatelier Principle and multimarket equilibria pp. 193-201: George Lady and James Quirk
The current non-status of general equilibrium theory pp. 203-219: Donald Katzner
Regional business development policy in Central and Eastern Europe: a mechanism design perspective pp. 221-242: Roswitha King

Can the majority lose the election? pp. 305-317: Bryan McCannon
Efficient trading with restriction pp. 319-334: Hu Lu and Yuntong Wang
Optimal auctions and information disclosure pp. 335-344: Alex Gershkov
How does interest rate policy affect inflation? A simple general equilibrium model with the interest rate as the policy instrument pp. 345-360: Richard Watt
A noncooperative view on two airport cost sharing rules pp. 361-376: J. Arin, E. Inarra and P. Luquin
The human side of mechanism design: a tribute to Leo Hurwicz and Jean-Jacques Laffont (Publisher’s Erratum) pp. 377-377: Daniel L. McFadden

Institutional design and conflict: an introduction pp. 167-170: Massimo Morelli
Power and efficiency in production pillage games pp. 171-193: J. Jordan
Alliances and negotiations: an incomplete information example pp. 195-203: Paola Manzini and Marco Mariotti
A model of strategic delegation in contests between groups pp. 205-232: Stefan Brandauer and Florian Englmaier
Mechanism design goes to war: peaceful outcomes with interdependent and correlated types pp. 233-250: Mark Fey and Kristopher Ramsay
Sanctions as revelation regimes pp. 251-278: Daniel Verdier
Arbitration systems and negotiations pp. 279-303: María Mercedes Adamuz and Clara Ponsati

Introduction to the issues in honor of Leonid Hurwicz pp. 1-1: John Ledyard
Two topics in Leo Hurwicz’s research pp. 3-6: Stanley Reiter
Inefficiency and complementarity in sharing games pp. 7-43: Dennis Courtney and Thomas Marschak
Strategic analysis of petty corruption with an intermediary pp. 45-57: Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky, Mukul Majumdar and Roy Radner
Fundamental theory of institutions: a lecture in honor of Leo Hurwicz pp. 59-75: Roger Myerson
The human side of mechanism design: a tribute to Leo Hurwicz and Jean-Jacque Laffont pp. 77-100: Daniel L. McFadden
Discrete implementation of the Groves–Ledyard mechanism pp. 101-114: J. Todd Swarthout and Mark Walker
Communication complexity and stability of equilibria in economies and games pp. 115-135: J. Jordan
Non-existence of equilibrium in Vickrey, second-price, and English auctions pp. 137-145: Matthew O. Jackson
The endowment game when n=2 pp. 147-165: Lu Hong

Informed principal and information gathering agent pp. 229-244: Dongsoo Shin and Sungho Yun
Optimal auctions for asymmetrically budget constrained bidders pp. 245-257: Alexey Malakhov and Rakesh Vohra
Opportunity analysis of newborn screening programs pp. 259-277: Carmen Herrero and Juan D. Moreno-Ternero
Differentiable strategy-proof mechanisms for private and public goods in domains that are not necessarily large or quasi-linear pp. 279-291: Luis C. Corchon and José Rueda-Llano
Coordinating under incomplete information pp. 293-313: Geir B. Asheim and Seung Yoo

Optimal fees in internet auctions pp. 155-163: Alexander Matros and Andriy Zapechelnyuk
Price experimentation with strategic buyers pp. 165-187: Oksana Loginova and Curtis Taylor
Innovation contests with temporary and endogenous monopoly rents pp. 189-208: Frederik Schmidt
On the optimality of nonmaximal fines in the presence of corruptible law enforcers pp. 209-227: Gorkem Celik and Serdar Sayan

Matching, search and intermediation with two-sided heterogeneity pp. 75-117: Nadia Burani
Labour market recruiting with intermediaries pp. 119-127: Paul Schweinzer
Optimal procurement mechanisms for divisible goods with capacitated suppliers pp. 129-154: Garud Iyengar and Anuj Kumar

Good neighbors are hard to find: computational complexity of network formation pp. 1-19: Richard Baron, Jacques Durieu, Hans Haller, Rahul Savani and Philippe Solal
Price asymptotics pp. 21-32: Kislaya Prasad
A coalitional game-theoretic model of stable government forms with umpires pp. 33-44: Stefano Vannucci
Optimal speculative trade among large traders pp. 45-74: Kfir Eliaz and Ran Spiegler