Size and distributional uncertainty, public information and the information paradox

Hans Gersbach ()

Social Choice and Welfare, 2000, vol. 17, issue 2, pages 241-246

Abstract: In this paper we examine the strategic implications of collective acquisition of information in a committee or in a legislature. We show that the prospect of acquiring information can harm a majority even if information is only available by the support of a majority. Moreover, the model provides two results about incentives to acquire information. First, for policies with high distributional uncertainties, we expect that less information is acquired collectively by a committee than for other policies. Second, for policies that show only size uncertainty, our model predicts intense efforts to acquire information collectively.

Date: 2000-02-29
Note: Received: 20 January 1997/Accepted: 15 February 1999
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