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Aggregation of preferences with a variable set of alternatives
Jean-François Laslier , 2000, vol. 17, issue 2, pages 269-282
Social Choice and Welfare Abstract:
A social choice correspondence called the Essential set is studied with the help of an axiom called Cloning Consistency. Cloning consistency is the requirement that the formal choice rule be insensitive to the replication of alternatives. The Essential set is the support of the optimal mixed strategies in a symmetric two-party electoral competition game.
Note: Received: 24 March 1998/Accepted: 3 March 1999
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Related works: Working Paper: Aggregation of preferences with a variable set of alternatives (1996) Working Paper: Aggregation of Preferences with a Variable set of Alternatives (1996) This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
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