Aggregation of preferences with a variable set of alternatives

Jean-François Laslier ()

Social Choice and Welfare, 2000, vol. 17, issue 2, pages 269-282

Abstract: A social choice correspondence called the Essential set is studied with the help of an axiom called Cloning Consistency. Cloning consistency is the requirement that the formal choice rule be insensitive to the replication of alternatives. The Essential set is the support of the optimal mixed strategies in a symmetric two-party electoral competition game.

Date: 2000-02-29
Note: Received: 24 March 1998/Accepted: 3 March 1999
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Working Paper: Aggregation of preferences with a variable set of alternatives (1996)
Working Paper: Aggregation of Preferences with a Variable set of Alternatives (1996)
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