Agreement, separability, and other axioms for quasi-linear social choice problems

Youngsub Chun ()
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Youngsub Chun: Division of Economics, Seoul National University, Seoul 151-742, Korea

Social Choice and Welfare, 2000, vol. 17, issue 3, pages 507-521

Abstract: A quasi-linear social choice problem is concerned with choosing one among a finite set of public projects and determining side payments among agents to cover the cost of the project, assuming each agent has quasi-linear preferences. We first investigate the logical relations between various axioms in this context. They are: agreement, separability, population solidarity, consistency, converse consistency, and population-and-cost solidarity. Also, on the basis of these axioms, we present alternative characterizations of egalitarian solutions; each solution assigns to each agent an equal share of the surplus derived from the public project over some reference utility level, but uses a different method to compute the reference utility level.

Date: 2000-05-02
Note: Received: 18 May 1998/Accepted: 1 July 1999
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