Constitutions, voting and democracy: A review

Norman Schofield ()

Social Choice and Welfare, 2001, vol. 18, issue 3, pages 571-600

Abstract: This review of William Riker's work suggests that his interest in rational choice theory was based on his desire to understand profound constitutional transformation in U.S. political history. Although he argued that "anything can happen in politics," his use of the notion of heresthetic allowed him to focus on key contingent events. Indeed his later work added depth to his inductive generalizations on the nature of "federal bargains" and coalition formation. Recent work by Austen-Smith and Banks, Merrill and Grofman, and Lijphart is also discussed in the light of Riker's earlier ideas on voting and democracy.

Date: 2001-07-12
Note: Received: 25 February 2000/Accepted: 16 March 2000

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