Bidding for envy-freeness: A procedural approach to n-player fair-division problems

Claus-Jochen Haake (), Matthias G. Raith () and Francis Edward Su ()
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Matthias G. Raith: Department of Economics, University of Magdeburg, P.O. Box 4120, 39016 Magdeburg, Germany
Francis Edward Su: Department of Mathematics, Harvey Mudd College, Claremont, CA 91711, USA

Social Choice and Welfare, 2002, vol. 19, issue 4, pages 723-749

Abstract: We develop a procedure for implementing an efficient and envy-free allocation of m objects among n individuals with the possibility of monetary side-payments, assuming that players have quasi-linear utility functions. The procedure eliminates envy by compensating envious players. It is fully descriptive and says explicitly which compensations should be made, and in what order. Moreover, it is simple enough to be carried out without computer support. We formally characterize the properties of the procedure, show how it establishes envy-freeness with minimal resources, and demonstrate its application to a wide class of fair-division problems.

Date: 2002-10-09
Note: Received: 6 March 2000/Accepted: 21 May 2001
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Working Paper: Bidding for Envy-Freeness: A Procedural Approach to n-Player Fair Division Problems (2000)
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