A characterization of the Nash bargaining solution

Eyal Winter (), Oscar Volij () and Nir Dagan ()

Social Choice and Welfare, 2002, vol. 19, issue 4, pages 811-823

Abstract: We characterize the Nash bargaining solution replacing the axiom of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives with three independent axioms: Independence of Non-Individually Rational Alternatives, Twisting, and Disagreement Point Convexity. We give a non-cooperative bargaining interpretation to this last axiom.

Date: 2002-10-09
Note: Received: 4 September 2000/Accepted: 6 September 2001
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Related works:
Working Paper: A Characterization of the Nash Bargaining Solution (2000)
Working Paper: A Characterization of the Nash Bargaining Solution (2002)
Working Paper: A Characterization of the Nash Bargaining Solution (2001)
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