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A purely non-cooperative model of divided government

Giovanna Iannantuoni ()

Social Choice and Welfare, 2004, vol. 22, issue 2, pages 401-412

Date: 2004

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Social Choice and Welfare is edited by John Duggan, Marc Fleurbaey, Wulf Gaertner and Maurice Salles

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