Competition, agency and productivityMark Rogers () International Journal of the Economics of Business, 2004, vol. 11, issue 3, pages 349-367 Abstract: This article tests a set of hypotheses relating to agency and Schumpeterian views on how competition affects performance. A survey data set of Australian workplaces is used, with the change in labour productivity as the dependent variable. The results show strong support for the idea that intense competition raises productivity growth in managerial workplaces, but not in non-managerial workplaces (i.e. where the principal owner also works). Testing the agency theories in more detail, we find no evidence that the number of competitors, the price elasticity of demand or a proxy for bankruptcy (pre-tax losses) are the mechanisms behind the process. For non-managerial workplaces the results indicate support for the idea that greater demand uncertainty reduces productivity growth. In contrast, for managerial workplaces, greater demand uncertainty tends to raise productivity growth. Keywords: Competition; Agency; Schumpeterian; Productivity; JEL Classification: L1 (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:ijecbs:v:11:y:2004:i:3:p:349-367 Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from Access Statistics for this article International Journal of the Economics of Business is edited by Eleanor Morgan and H.E. Frech More articles in International Journal of the Economics of Business from Taylor and Francis Journals |
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