The Network Industry, Monopoly Regulation, and Social Optimum

Uriel Spiegel, Ben-Zion, Uri, Tchai Tavor and Joseph Templeman

International Journal of the Economics of Business, 2008, vol. 15, issue 3, pages 323-337

Abstract: This paper examines pricing policy, quality levels, consumer surplus and social welfare for the monopoly and non-monopoly case. It is shown that given certain realistic assumptions, the network industry under unregulated monopoly would yield more social welfare than in the case of several producers in the industry, and would therefore be socially preferred.

Keywords: Monopoly; Duopoly; Quality; Network Externalities; Social Optimum (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008

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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:ijecbs:v:15:y:2008:i:3:p:323-337

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