Strategic Implications of Learning by Doing

Aidan Hollis

International Journal of the Economics of Business, 2002, vol. 9, issue 2, pages 157-174

Abstract: This paper examines firm strategy when competitors are at different points along the learning curve. It shows that firms high on the learning curve will have strong incentives to exclude new competitors, while firms that are learning more slowly will have weaker incentives to hinder new competitors and may even wish to encourage entry. The same strategies are shown to apply when firm reputation is acquired through participation in an industry. Several examples of strategic behaviour that take advantage of differential learning speeds or heterogeneous reputations are suggested and a variety of applications of the principle involved are explored.

Keywords: Learning By Doing; Strategic Behaviour; Entry Deterrence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002
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