Player heterogeneity and empiricism in Schelling

Alessandro Innocenti ()

Journal of Economic Methodology, 2007, vol. 14, issue 4, pages 409-428

Abstract: The main thesis of this paper is that Schelling's empiricism is deeply grounded in the assumption of player heterogeneity. He peoples games with real individuals and consequently postulates that there are differences in roles or identities among them. The subjects populating Schelling's thought or real experiments do not suppose that other players follow identical or symmetrical rules of logical inference to make their choices. This hypothesis is decisive in shaping Schelling's inductive game theory, which is applied by means of a three-step procedure. First, players are defined by making their differentiating features explicit. Secondly, heterogeneous players are embedded in a real environment to play the game. Thirdly, the game solution is derived inductively. This interpretation helps to explain why little progress has been made overall in developing Schelling's insights.

Keywords: player heterogeneity; inductive game theory; symmetry; coordination (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007

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