Games and Quantity implicatures

Robert van Rooij

Journal of Economic Methodology, 2008, vol. 15, issue 3, pages 261-274

Abstract: In this paper we seek to account for scalar implicatures and Horn's division of pragmatic labor in game-theoretical terms by making use mainly of refinements of the standard solution concept of signaling games. Scalar implicatures are accounted for in terms of Farrell's (1993) notion of a 'neologism-proof' equilibrium together with Grice's maxim of Quality. Horn's division of pragmatic labor is accounted for in terms of Cho and Kreps' (1987) notion of 'equilibrium domination' and their 'Intuitive Criterion'.

Keywords: conversational implicatures; game theory; Horn's division; Intuitive Criterion; neologism-proofness; pragmatics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008

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