Persistent dumping, competition and welfare

Ying Kong

Journal of International Trade & Economic Development, 2003, vol. 12, issue 1, pages 19-37

Abstract: In the case of persistent dumping, welfare effects are ambiguous. Therefore, the existing international trade theory cannot provide a clear rationale for policies to prohibit international price discrimination. Through a two-stage game on the endogenous foreign monopolist's dumping decision, this paper determines when persistent dumping will negatively affect the home country's total welfare in an oligopolistic domestic market in the absence of any anti-dumping duties. Key variables of interest in this research include: (i) production costs; (ii) the degree of substitutability among the products; and (iii) the number of domestic firms. With a linear demand and constant marginal cost functions, the model demonstrates that persistent dumping will reduce total welfare if the domestic market is relatively less concentrated, or if the products are close substitutes for each other.

Keywords: International Trade; Trade Policy; Market Structure; International Price Discrimination (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003

Downloads: (external link)
http://taylorandfrancis.metapress.com/link.asp?tar ... &id=Y1C20B1WJ04M8YUU (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:jitecd:v:12:y:2003:i:1:p:19-37

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals/subscription.html

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of International Trade & Economic Development is edited by Pasquale M. Sgro and Bharat R. Hazari

More articles in Journal of International Trade & Economic Development from Taylor and Francis Journals
Series data maintained by Christopher F. Baum ().