Equilibrium coalition structures in the presence of foreign direct investmentHyejoon Im Journal of International Trade & Economic Development, 2009, vol. 18, issue 1, pages 139-167 Abstract: This paper incorporates foreign direct investment (FDI) into the examination of trading bloc formation with endogenously determined coalition structures. In so doing, we build a three-country model, in which firms serve foreign markets either by exporting or undertaking FDI, and consider a coalition formation game with the Coalition Proof Nash Equilibrium as an equilibrium concept. We find that the equilibrium coalition structure varies upon firms characterization before and after the formation of a trading bloc. As in the literature, when all firms are exporters in the pre- and post-formation, bilateralism can be an equilibrium outcome. However, when trade barriers are not so high as to be trade-prohibitive and the environment is favorable to multinational activities in the pre- or post-formation, only global free trade will prevail as an equilibrium coalition structure. Keywords: trading blocs; FTA; multinational corporations; FDI; coalition formation game (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:jitecd:v:18:y:2009:i:1:p:139-167 Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from Access Statistics for this article Journal of International Trade & Economic Development is edited by Pasquale M. Sgro and Bharat R. Hazari More articles in Journal of International Trade & Economic Development from Taylor and Francis Journals |
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