A theory of stability in many-to-many matching markets

Federico Echenique () and Jorge Oviedo ()
Additional contact information
Jorge Oviedo: Universidad Nacional de San Luis, Argentina

Theoretical Economics, 2006, vol. 1, issue 2, pages 233-273

Abstract: We develop a theory of stability in many-to-many matching markets. We give conditions under which the setwise-stable set, a core-like concept, is nonempty and can be approached through an algorithm. The usual core may be empty. The setwise-stable set coincides with the pairwise-stable set and with the predictions of a non-cooperative bargaining model. The setwise-stable set possesses the conflict/coincidence of interest properties from many-to-one, and one-to-one models. The theory parallels the standard theory of stability for many-to-one, and one-to-one, models. We provide results for a number of core-like solutions, besides the setwise-stable set.

Keywords: Two-sided matching; cooperative game theory; core (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-06-01
View citations in EconPapers

Downloads: (external link)
http://econtheory.org/ojs/index.php/te/article/view/2006233/23 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: A Theory of Stability in Many-to-many Matching Markets (2004)
Working Paper: A Theory of Stability in Many-to-Many Matching Markets (2005)
Working Paper: A Theory of Stability in Many-to-many Matching Markets (2003)
Working Paper: A Theory of Stability in Many-to-Many Matching Markets (2003)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:the:publsh:139

Access Statistics for this article

Theoretical Economics is edited by Jeffrey C. Ely, Edward Green, Barton L. Lipman, Martin J. Osborne, and Debraj Ray

More articles in Theoretical Economics from Society for Economic Theory
Series data maintained by Martin J. Osborne ().