Strategy-proofness and single-crossing

Alejandro Saporiti ()

Theoretical Economics, 2009, vol. 4, issue 2, pages 127-163

Abstract: This paper analyzes strategy-proof collective choice rules when individuals have single-crossing preferences on a finite and ordered set of social alternatives. It shows that a social choice rule is anonymous, unanimous, and strategy-proof on a maximal single-crossing domain if and only if it is an extended median rule with n-1 fixed ballots distributed over the individuals' most preferred alternatives. As a by-product, the paper also proves that strategy-proofness implies the tops-only property. It also offers a strategic foundation for the so-called "single-crossing version" of the Median Voter Theorem, by showing that the median ideal point can be implemented in dominant strategies by a direct mechanism in which every individual reveals his true preferences.

Keywords: Single-crossing; strategy-proofness; tops-only; peak rules (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D71 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-06-09

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Related works:
Working Paper: Strategy-Proofness and Single-Crossing (2008)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:the:publsh:399

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