Local stability under evolutionary game dynamics

William H. Sandholm ()
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William H. Sandholm: Department of Economics, University of Wisconsin

Theoretical Economics, Forthcoming

Abstract: We prove that any regular ESS is asymptotically stable under any impartial pairwise comparison dynamic, including the Smith dynamic; under any separable excess payoff dynamic, including the BNN dynamic; and under the best response dynamic. Combined with existing results for imitative dynamics, our analysis validates the use of ESS as a blanket sufficient condition for local stability under evolutionary game dynamics.

Keywords: Evolutionary game dynamics; ESS (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-09-06

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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:the:publsh:505

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