Aircraft Noise Regulation, Airline Service Quality, and Social Welfare: the Monopoly Case
Journal of Transport Economics and Policy, 2010, vol. 44, issue 1, pages 17-35
This paper develops a simple theoretical model to analyse the effects of noise regulation on a monopoly airline's flight frequency, traffic volume, and aircraft 'quietness' choices. Two types of noise limit are considered: a cumulative limit on total noise at an airport and a limit on noise per aircraft operation. Tighter noise limits, which reduce community exposure to noise, cause airlines to reduce flight frequency and traffic served, thus hurting consumers. A welfare analysis explores socially optimal noise regulation, taking into account the social cost of noise damage along with consumer surplus and airline profit. © 2010 LSE and the University of Bath
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Journal of Transport Economics and Policy is edited by B T Bayliss, S A Morrison, D Gillen and D N Starkie
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