Markets For Partially Contractible Knowledge: Bootstrapping Versus Bundling

James J. Anton () and Dennis A. Yao
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Dennis A. Yao: Harvard University and University of Pennsylvania,

Journal of the European Economic Association, 2005, vol. 3, issue 2-3, pages 745-754

Abstract: We discuss how a seller can appropriate rents when selling knowledge that lacks legal property rights by solving either an expropriation or a valuation problem and then analyze how seller rents increase when a portion of the intellectual property (IP) can be protected. The analysis shows that a sequential strategy in which the protected portion of the IP is sold prior to selling the unprotected IP is superior to selling both portions of the IP as a bundle. (JEL: D23, L14, O31) Copyright (c) 2005 The European Economic Association.

Date: 2005

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