The Rotten-Kid Theorem Meets the Samaritan's Dilemma

Neil Bruce and Michael Waldman ()

The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1990, vol. 105, issue 1, pages 155-65

Abstract: A familiar result in the economic theory of the family is Becker's rotten-kid theorem. This theorem states that altruism by a family member will lead other selfish members to act efficiently from the family viewpoint. The authors extend Becker's one-period model to two periods and show that parental altruism can result in an inefficiency known in other contexts as the Samaritan's dilemma. Implications of this for transfer arrangements within the family and for the Ricardian equivalence theorem are drawn. Copyright 1990, the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Date: 1990
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Related works:
Working Paper: The Rotten-Kid Theorem Meets the Samaritan's Dilemma (1986)
Working Paper: The Rotten-Kid Theorem Meets the Samaritan's Dilemma (1986)
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