Corruption

Andrei Shleifer and Robert W Vishny

The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1993, vol. 108, issue 3, pages 599-617

Abstract: This paper presents two propositions about corruption. First, the structure of government institutions and of the political process are very important determinants of the level of corruption. In particular, weak governments that do not control their agencies experience very high corruption levels. Second, the illegality of corruption and the need for secrecy make it much more distortionary and costly than its sister activity, taxation. These results may explain why, in some less developed countries, corruption is so high and so costly to development. Copyright 1993, the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Date: 1993
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