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Women's Liberation: What's in It for Men?

Matthias Doepke () and Michele Tertilt ()

The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2009, vol. 124, issue 4, pages 1541-1591

Abstract: The nineteenth century witnessed dramatic improvements in the legal rights of married women. Given that they took place long before women gained the right to vote, these changes amounted to a voluntary renunciation of power by men. In this paper, we investigate men's incentives for sharing power with women. In our model, women's legal rights set the marital bargaining power of husbands and wives. We show that men face a trade-off between the rights they want for their own wives (namely none) and the rights of other women in the economy. Men prefer other men's wives to have rights because men care about their own daughters and because an expansion of women's rights increases educational investments in children. We show that men may agree to relinquish some of their power once technological change increases the importance of human capital. We corroborate our argument with historical evidence on the expansion of women's rights in England and the United States. (c) 2009 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology..

Date: 2009
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Working Paper: Women's Liberation: What's in It for Men? (2008) Downloads
Working Paper: Women’s Liberation: What’s in It for Men? (2008) Downloads
Working Paper: Women's Liberation: What's in It for Men? (2008) Downloads
Working Paper: Women's Liberation: What's in It for Men? (2008) Downloads
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