Branch Banking And The Geography Of Bank Pricing
Paul S. Calem and
Leonard I. Nakamura
The Review of Economics and Statistics, 1998, vol. 80, issue 4, pages 600-610
We show that bank branching tends to mitigate localized market power by broadening the geographic scope of competition among banks, even though branch banking allows banks to differentiate themselves through their choices of branch locations. Banking services at peripheral locations will be priced more competitively when those locales are served by branch networks. We develop a theoretical model in support of this view and offer empirical evidence. © 1998 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technolog
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations View citations in EconPapers (12) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tpr:restat:v:80:y:1998:i:4:p:600-610
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://mitpress.mit. ... me.tcl?issn=00346535
Access Statistics for this article
The Review of Economics and Statistics is edited by Daron Acemoglu, George J. Borjas, Dani Rodrik and Julio J. Rotemberg
More articles in The Review of Economics and Statistics from MIT Press
Series data maintained by Karie Kirkpatrick ().