The Effect Of Collective Bargaining Legislation On Strikes And Wages

Peter Cramton (), Morley Gunderson () and Joseph Tracy ()

The Review of Economics and Statistics, 1999, vol. 81, issue 3, pages 475-487

Abstract: Using Canadian data on large, private-sector contract negotiations from January, 1967, to March, 1993, we find that strikes and wages are substantially influenced by labor policy. The data indicate that conciliation policies have largely been ineffective in reducing strike costs. In contrast, general contract reopener provisions appear to make both unions and employers better off by reducing negotiation costs without systematically affecting wage settlements. Legislation banning the use of replacement workers appears to lead to significantly higher negotiation costs and redistribution of quasi-rents from employers to unions. © 2000 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technolog

Date: 1999
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Related works:
Working Paper: The Effect of Collective Bargaining Legislation on Strikes and Wages (1995)
Working Paper: The Effect of Collective Bargaining Legislation on Strikes and Wages (1998)
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