Market Structure, Competition, and Pricing in United States International Telephone Service Markets

Gary Madden and Scott James Savage ()

The Review of Economics and Statistics, 2000, vol. 82, issue 2, pages 291-296

Abstract: Several national governments argue international telephone prices are high because of asymmetric competition and inefficiencies in the accounting arrangements that govern the telecommunications services trade. This paper develops a model of U.S. international telephone pricing that allows for the accounting rate system and contains market-structure variables for both the U.S. and foreign ends of bilateral markets. Model estimation is on 39 bilateral telephone markets from 1991 through 1994. Parameter estimates reveal that settlement rates, market concentration, competition at either end of the bilateral market, and ownership are significant determinants of prices. These findings support initiatives promoting accounting-rate reductions and increased competition. © 2000 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Date: 2000
View citations in EconPapers

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.catchword.com/cgi-bin/cgi?ini=bc&body=l ... 0000501)82:2L.291;1- (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tpr:restat:v:82:y:2000:i:2:p:291-296

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://mitpress.mit. ... me.tcl?issn=00346535

Access Statistics for this article

The Review of Economics and Statistics is edited by Daron Acemoglu, George J. Borjas, Dani Rodrik and Julio J. Rotemberg

More articles in The Review of Economics and Statistics from MIT Press
Series data maintained by Christopher F. Baum ().