Insecurity And The Pattern Of Trade: An Empirical Investigation

James Anderson () and Douglas Marcouiller

The Review of Economics and Statistics, 2002, vol. 84, issue 2, pages 342-352

Abstract: Corruption and imperfect contract enforcement dramatically reduce international trade. This paper estimates the reduction using a structural model of import demand in which insecurity acts as a hidden tax on trade. We find that inadequate institutions constrain trade as much as tariffs do. We also find that omission of indices of institutional quality biases the estimates of typical gravity models, obscuring a negative relationship between per capita income and the share of total expenditure devoted to traded goods. Finally, we argue that cross-country variation in the effectiveness of institutions and the consequent variation in the prices of traded goods offer a simple explanation for the stylized fact that high-income, capital-abundant countries trade disproportionately with each other. © 2001 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technolog

Date: 2002
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