Work Rules, Featherbedding, and Pareto-optimal Union-Management Bargaining

George E Johnson

Journal of Labor Economics, 1990, vol. 8, issue 1, pages S237-59

Abstract: This article examines a model of "semiefficient" bargaining in which the union and the firm bargain over wages and various types of work rules. The results are compared to the outcomes that are associated with fully efficient bargaining (i.e., over wages and the level of employment) and bargaining solely over wages. Copyright 1990 by University of Chicago Press.

Date: 1990

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