Selective Counteroffers

John Barron (), Mark C. Berger and Dan Black ()
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Mark C. Berger: (deceased)
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: James J. Heckman

Journal of Labor Economics, 2006, vol. 24, issue 3, pages 385-410

Abstract: The existence of counteroffers can lead to a variety of important labor-market features. This article develops a model of the selective use of counteroffers in which a firm decides whether to extend counteroffers after a worker informs the firm of an alternative offer. We outline factors that can influence the employer's net value of making a counteroffer and, thus, affect the likelihood of a counteroffer. We provide a new empirical analysis that examines whether proxies for these factors do, in fact, influence the likelihood that a firm would consider a counteroffer to an employee with a competing offer.

Date: 2006
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