Abstract:
Case and statutory law often condition liability on the safety of the defendant's product relative to competing products. This article explores the safety and welfare implications of commonly observed "technological advancement: and "customary practice" tests of productive liability. We find that, in general, the technological advancement test yields excessive safety expenditures, while the customary practice test leads to inadequate safety. In addition, we show that characteristics of the law vary across jurisdictions and in ways that can significantly affect the tests' desirability. Two particularly important characteristics are the degree to which the tests are conclusive and whether or not compliance with government standards is used as an external complement to relative safety evidence. Jurisdictions can mitigate the worst tendencies of relative safety tests by not allowing them to be conclusive and by allowing for reference to government or other external standards. Copyright 1997 by the University of Chicago.
Date: 1997
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Journal of Legal Studies is edited by Eric A. Posner and Thomas J. Miles
More articles in Journal of Legal Studies from University of Chicago Press Address: The University of Chicago Press, Journals Division, P.O. Box 37005 Chicago, IL 60637 Series data maintained by Christopher F. Baum ().
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