An Empirical Assessment of Early Offer Reform for Medical Malpractice

Joni Hersch (), Jeffrey O'Connell and W Kip Viscusi

Journal of Legal Studies, 2007, vol. 36, issue S2, pages S231-S259

Abstract: The early offer reform proposal for medical malpractice provides an option for claimants to receive prompt payment of all their net economic losses and reasonable attorney fees. Using a large sample of closed individual medical malpractice claims from Texas supplemented by data from Florida, this article provides an empirical assessment of the consequences of the early offer reform. Noneconomic damages make up about two-thirds of paid claim amounts. The minimum payment amount for serious injuries will affect the magnitude of insurer savings and claimant compensation. Payments to claimants will be expedited by 2 years by the early offer reform, and litigation costs will be reduced by an average of $100,000-$200,000 per claim. (c) 2007 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved..

Date: 2007

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