Abstract:
This paper analyzes three issues critical to understanding the chronic shortage of organs. Section 2 develops a simple economic model of altruism that helps explain how markets with altruistic participants operate like ordinary economic markets but produce an equilibrium position in which more organs are transferred at lower cash prices. Section 3 examines and rejects the various arguments used to undermine the neoclassical arguments in the first section. Section 4 looks at ways to expand the supply of organs: directed donations within families and among friends, solicited organs via MatchingDonors.com, donor-recipient pairs, and LifeSharers. (c) 2008 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved..
Journal of Legal Studies is edited by Eric A. Posner and Thomas J. Miles
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