Abstract:
This paper considers the choice between an all-or-nothing (AON) rule and a proportionate-damages (PD) rule in civil litigation. Under AON, a prevailing plaintiff receives a judgment equal to his entire damages. Under PD, damages are reduced to reflect uncertainty. For example, if the trier of fact finds that there is a 75 percent chance that the defendant is liable, the judgment would equal 75 percent of the plaintiff's damages. Using a moral hazard model that takes into account defendants' decisions to comply with legal rules, evidentiary uncertainty, and settlement, we show that AON usually maximizes the rate of compliance, although it may result in a higher level of litigation. This, in turn, provides an efficiency rationale for the ubiquity of AON in the legal system. (c) 2009 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved..
Journal of Legal Studies is edited by Eric A. Posner and Thomas J. Miles
More articles in Journal of Legal Studies from University of Chicago Press Address: The University of Chicago Press, Journals Division, P.O. Box 37005 Chicago, IL 60637 Series data maintained by Christopher F. Baum ().
This site is part of RePEc
and all the data displayed here is part of the RePEc data set.
Is your work missing from RePEc? Here is how to
contribute.
Questions or problems? Check the EconPapers FAQ or send mail to .