Competitive Search Equilibrium

Espen R. Moen

Journal of Political Economy, 1997, vol. 105, issue 2, pages 385-411

Abstract: In this paper, the author constructs an equilibrium for markets with frictions, which is competitive in the sense that all agents are price takers and maximize utility subject to a set of market parameters. He shows that the equilibrium can be achieved if employers with vacancies can advertise publicly the wages they pay. Copyright 1997 by the University of Chicago.

Date: 1997
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Working Paper: Competitive Search Equilibrium (1995)
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