Coordination and Experimentation in M-Form and U-Form Organizations

Yingyi Qian, Gérard Roland () and Chenggang Xu

Journal of Political Economy, 2006, vol. 114, issue 2, pages 366-402

Abstract: We compare the performance of organizational forms (M-form and U-form) in experimenting with uncertain projects. In our framework, organizational forms affect the information structure of an organization and thus the way to coordinate changes. Compared to the U-form, the M-form organization achieves better coordination in "attribute matching" but suffers from coordination in "attribute compatibility" and less gains in specialization. The distinctive advantage of the M-form is its flexibility in choosing between small-scale and full-scale experimentation.

Date: 2006
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