Voter Influence and Big Policy Change: The Positive Political Economy of the New Deal

Robert K. Fleck

Journal of Political Economy, 2008, vol. 116, issue 1, pages 1-37

Abstract: What conditions cause major policy changes under representative government? This article addresses that question by providing a theoretically grounded analysis of a massive policy change: the New Deal. It explains how the economic problems of the early 1930s initiated changes on several dimensions of policy: federal spending, labor market regulation, and civil rights. The article concludes by considering the broader lessons learned from the political economy of the New Deal. (c) 2008 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved..

Date: 2008
View citations in EconPapers

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/pdf/10.1086/528999 link to full text (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ucp:jpolec:v:116:y:2008:i:1:p:1-37

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/JPE/order1.html

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Political Economy is edited by Steven D. Levitt, MONIKA PIAZZESI, CANICE PRENDERGAST and ROBERT SHIMER

More articles in Journal of Political Economy from University of Chicago Press
Address: The University of Chicago Press, Journals Division, P.O. Box 37005 Chicago, IL 60637
Series data maintained by Christopher F. Baum ().