Vote Buying: General Elections

Eddie Dekel (), Matthew O. Jackson () and Asher Wolinsky

Journal of Political Economy, 2008, vol. 116, issue 2, pages 351-380

Abstract: We examine the consequences of vote buying, assuming this practice were allowed and free of stigma. Two parties compete in a binary election and may purchase votes in a sequential bidding game via up-front binding payments and/or campaign promises (platforms) that are contingent on the outcome of the election. We analyze the role of the parties' and voters' preferences in determining the winner and the payments to voters. (c) 2008 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved..

Date: 2008

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Journal of Political Economy is edited by Steven D. Levitt, MONIKA PIAZZESI, CANICE PRENDERGAST and ROBERT SHIMER

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