Third degree waiting time discrimination: optimal allocation of a public sector healthcare treatment under rationing by waiting

Hugh Gravelle () and Luigi Siciliani ()

Health Economics, 2009, vol. 18, issue 8, pages 977-986

Abstract: In many public healthcare systems treatments are rationed by waiting time. We examine the optimal allocation of a fixed supply of a given treatment between different groups of patients. Even in the absence of any distributional aims, welfare is increased by third degree waiting time discrimination: setting different waiting times for different groups waiting for the same treatment. Because waiting time imposes dead weight losses on patients, lower waiting times should be offered to groups with higher marginal waiting time costs and with less elastic demand for the treatment. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Date: 2009
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Working Paper: Third degree waiting time discrimination: optimal allocation of a public sector health care treatment under rationing by waiting (2007)
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