Splitting the pie: rent distribution in alliances and networks

Jeffrey H. Dyer, Harbir Singh and Prashant Kale
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Jeffrey H. Dyer: Brigham Young University, Provo, UT, USA, Postal: Brigham Young University, Provo, UT, USA
Harbir Singh: University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, USA, Postal: University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, USA
Prashant Kale: University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI, USA, Postal: University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI, USA

Managerial and Decision Economics, 2008, vol. 29, issue 2-3, pages 137-148

Abstract: This paper addresses the issue of how relational rents, generated through alliances, are distributed to the participating firms. We argue that rent distribution is influenced by factors affecting both jointly generated common benefits and private benefits gained from the alliance relationship. We draw on four perspectives to explain these various effects. The first three, namely the resource dependence perspective, related resources perspective, and structural holes perspective, essentially highlight the private 'exploitation' opportunities that a firm's alliance network presents the focal firm. In contrast, the resource development perspective underscores the private 'exploration' benefits a firm potentially derives from its alliance network. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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