Delegation in first-price all-pay auctions

Kai A. Konrad (), Wolfgang Peters and Karl Wärneryd
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Wolfgang Peters: Department of Economics, European University Viadrina, Germany, Postal: Department of Economics, European University Viadrina, Germany

Managerial and Decision Economics, 2004, vol. 25, issue 5, pages 283-290

Abstract: In a first-price all-pay auction buyers have an incentive to delegate the bidding to agents and to provide these agents with incentives to make bids that differ from the bids the buyers would like to make. Both buyers are better off in this strictly non-cooperative delegation equilibrium and the delegation contracts are asymmetric, even if the buyers and the auction are perfectly symmetric. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Date: 2004
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Working Paper: Delegation in first-price all-pay auctions (1999)
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