Tax asymmetry and futures hedging under liquidity constraints

Kit Pong Wong
Additional contact information
Kit Pong Wong: School of Economics and Finance, University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Postal: School of Economics and Finance, University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong

Managerial and Decision Economics, 2005, vol. 26, issue 4, pages 271-281

Abstract: This paper examines the optimal futures hedging decision of a firm facing uncertain income that is subject to asymmetric taxation with no loss-offset provisions. All futures contracts are marked to market and require interim cash settlement of gains and losses. The firm is liquidity constrained in that it is forced to prematurely close its futures position on which the interim loss incurred exceeds a threshold level. The liquidity risk created by the interim funding requirement of a futures hedge is shown to proffer the firm perverse incentives, thereby making an under-hedge optimal. This under-hedging result holds irrespective of whether the firm is risk neutral or risk averse. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Date: 2005
View list of references

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1223 Link to full text; subscription required (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:26:y:2005:i:4:p:271-281

Access Statistics for this article

Managerial and Decision Economics is edited by Paul H. Rubin

More articles in Managerial and Decision Economics from John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Series data maintained by Christopher F. Baum ().