Hierarchical reporting, aggregation, and information cascades

Anil Arya (), Jonathan Glover and Brian Mittendorf
Additional contact information
Jonathan Glover: Carnegie Mellon University, USA, Postal: Carnegie Mellon University, USA
Brian Mittendorf: Yale School of Management, USA, Postal: Yale School of Management, USA

Managerial and Decision Economics, 2006, vol. 27, issue 5, pages 355-362

Abstract: Aggregation is commonly associated with loss of information. In contrast, this paper shows that aggregation can actually enhance information down-the-road by deterring information cascades. In particular, when hierarchical tiers forward only aggregate recommendations rather than nitty-gritty details, it increases the uncertainty faced by subsequent tiers. This makes individuals at higher levels more willing to rely on and convey their own views rather than simply rubber stamping suggestions from lower levels. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Date: 2006
View list of references View citations in EconPapers

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1267 Link to full text; subscription required (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:27:y:2006:i:5:p:355-362

Access Statistics for this article

Managerial and Decision Economics is edited by Paul H. Rubin

More articles in Managerial and Decision Economics from John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Series data maintained by Christopher F. Baum ().