Social norms, coordination and collaboration in heterogeneous teams

Marilyne Antonetti and Alexandra Rufini
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Marilyne Antonetti: Université Nice Sophia - Antipolis, GREDEG-DEMOS-CNRS, France, Postal: Université Nice Sophia - Antipolis, GREDEG-DEMOS-CNRS, France
Alexandra Rufini: Université Nice Sophia - Antipolis, GREDEG-DEMOS-CNRS, France, Postal: Université Nice Sophia - Antipolis, GREDEG-DEMOS-CNRS, France

Managerial and Decision Economics, 2008, vol. 29, issue 7, pages 547-554

Abstract: This paper considers the coordinating role of social norms in a heterogeneous team of workers. We define an optimal unit of production as a form of organisation involving several teams and members, with the following properties: (i) a social norm operating to coordinate individual efforts; (ii) a team with heterogeneous skills, enabling generation of synergies. Our model suggests that competences of the best worker are transferred to his or her peers. This collaborative process enhances team efficiency but only if there is an implicit ex ante coordinating device based on social norms that discourage free riding. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Date: 2008
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:29:y:2008:i:7:p:547-554

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