Allocation of decision rights in joint ventures

J. Windsperger
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J. Windsperger: Department of Management, University of Vienna, Vienna, Austria, Postal: Department of Management, University of Vienna, Vienna, Austria

Managerial and Decision Economics, 2009, vol. 30, issue 8, pages 491-501

Abstract: Previous studies in organizational economics and international business research have not tested a property rights view on the allocation of decision rights (DR) in joint ventures (JVs). The paper offers a test of the property rights explanation by using data from Hungarian JVs. Our analysis derives the following hypothesis: The more important the JV partner's intangible knowledge assets for the generation of residual surplus, the more residual DR are assigned to him. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Date: 2009

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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:30:y:2009:i:8:p:491-501

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