A GENERALIZED MODEL OF BEST RESPONSE ADAPTATION

Ulrich Berger ()

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2006, vol. 08, issue 01, pages 45-66

Abstract: We present a generalized model of myopic best response adaptation in large populations. In asymmetric conflicts, individuals can be in the role of the row player or the column player. The idea that an individual's role need not be fixed is introduced explicitly in our model by a process of role switching. The best response dynamics, the symmetrized best response dynamics, and the continuous time fictitious play process are included as special cases. We show that the set of Nash equilibria is attracting for zero-sum games. Moreover, for any base game, convergence to a Nash equilibrium implies convergence to a Nash equilibrium on the Wright manifold in the role game.

Keywords: Role games; best reply dynamics; best response dynamics; fictitious play; Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72; Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006

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